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The more things change, the more they
stay the same . . . or do they?
Kim Gould*
A notorious feature of the pre-uniform NSW defamation law was its s 22
statutory qualified privilege defence. Notwithstanding its promise, judicial
interpretation had left the defence with little work to do with the result that few
defendants have been able to find comfort in its terms. That defence has
now been picked up and extended to all Australian jurisdictions via s 30 and
its counterparts in the uniform defamation legislation which commenced
operation last year. The question that arises is whether the s 30 defence is
doomed to suffer the same fate as its NSW predecessor?
Introduction
On 1 January 2006 the long-awaited uniform civil defamation legislation
commenced operation in all the states and then a little later in the ACT and the
Northern Territory on 23 February 2006 and 26 April respectively.1 Gone are
the days of grappling with eight different civil defamation laws in Australia.
We now only have to contend with one, uniform, or at least nearly uniform,
law.2 This has been rightly hailed as ‘a historic achievement’3 and ‘a triumph
for state and territory cooperation and common sense’.4
The uniform defamation legislation basically enacts the States and
Territories Model Defamation Provisions that were released in November
2005.5 This model, in turn, draws ‘substantially’ from the Defamation Act
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Technology, Sydney.
1 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld);
Defamation Act 2005 (SA); Defamation Act 2005 (WA); and, Defamation Act 2005 (Tas);
Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) Ch 9 and Defamation Act 2006 (NT). As yet, criminal
defamation does not form part of the uniform scheme. Given the differences in the naming
and numbering of the Acts making up the uniform defamation legislative scheme, for
convenience sake, subsequent references to provisions of the uniform defamation legislation
will be to provisions of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) unless otherwise indicated.
2 Juries may be elected in accordance with s 21 in all jurisdictions except for South Australia,
the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. See s 22 for the role to be played
by juries where elected in a civil defamation trial. Also, the provision precluding actions for
defamation of deceased persons (s 10) was dropped from the Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) but
this was expected to ‘have no legal effect’ as such actions are also precluded at common law:
See Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 December 2005, pp 36–7,
(Mrs Jackson, Attorney-General) <http://www.hansard.parliament.tas.gov.au>. Not all
jurisdictions enacted their uniform defamation legislation in a ‘Defamation Act 2005’ (see
above n 1) and the numbering of each Act is not completely uniform.
3 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Bill 2005 (WA), Legislative Assembly, 17 August
2005, p 4129 (J A McGinty, WA Attorney-General) <http://www.parliament.
wa.gov.au/index.htm>.
4 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Bill 2005 (Qld), Legislative Assembly, 25 October
2005, p 3425 (L D Lavarch, Qld Minister for Justice and Attorney-General)
<http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/>.
5 States and Territories Model Defamation Provisions (November 2005)
<http://www.agd.nsw.gov.au/report/lpd_reports.nsf/pages/rep_index>.
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1974 (NSW),6 although there are some important differences.7
One notorious feature of the pre-uniform NSW defamation law that has
now been extended to all jurisdictions is its s 22 statutory qualified privilege
defence.8 This has been imported into each jurisdiction via s 30 and its
counterparts.9
Given the poor track record of the old s 22 defence, this is perhaps a little
surprising. So, too, was the apparent complacency with which this was
achieved,10 although that is not to say that there were not some last minute
‘pleas’ for reconsideration.11
To say that the s 22 defence was a disappointment for defendants, and
media defendants in particular, is probably an understatement. It had become
infamous for its ‘spectacular lack of success’,12 leading to it being branded
‘virtually a toothless tiger’13 and ‘in effect, a dead letter’.14 The question that
arises is whether its progeny is doomed to suffer the same fate?
It was generally recognised that the stumbling block for defendants seeking
to rely on the s 22 defence was its reasonableness of conduct requirement
(s 22(1)(c)) and ‘the restrictive way’ that requirement had been interpreted by
the courts.15 The question becomes then whether the s 30 defence will also be
plagued by this judicial interpretation in the uniform defamation era?
6 P George, Defamation Law in Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2006,
at [3.5].
7 Notably, truth alone will be a defence (s 25); the abandonment of the troublesome
imputation system (s 8); a cap on damages for non-economic loss (of $250,000) (s 35); and,
the expansion of the role of juries (s 22).
8 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 22. Henceforth, subsequent references to ‘s 22’ will be to
Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 22.
9 See Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 30; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 30; Defamation Act 2005
(WA) s 30; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 30; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 28; Civil Law
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 139A; and Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 27. Given the different
numbering in each Act, for convenience sake, subsequent reference to ‘s 30’ will be to
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 30.
10 Which did not escape the attention of at least one commentator: P D T Applegarth, ‘When
Reasonableness is Unreasonable’ (8 July 2005) Gazette of Law and Journalism 1,
at <http://www.lawpress.com.au/genews/ge165_Applegarth_QP_080705.html>.
11 Ibid; D Spence, ‘Spare Us the Unreasonableness of Uniformity’ (27 July 2005) Gazette of
Law and Journalism, at <http://ww.lawpress.com.au/genews/ge165_Spence_
QP_270705.html>.
12 M Gillooly, The Third Man: Reform of the Australasian Defamation Defences, Federation
Press, Annandale, 2004, p 158.
13 A A Henskens, ‘Defamation and Investigative Journalism in New South Wales: The
Evolution of Statutory Qualified Privilege’ (1990) 6 Aust Bar Rev 267 at 268.
14 Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Revised Outline of a Possible National
Defamation Law, July 2004, pp 21–2, <http://www.ag.gov.au>, referring to submissions
received in relation to the s 22 defence as well as the Lange extended form of common law
qualified privilege.
15 See ibid, pp 21–2. See also New South Wales Attorney-General’s Task Force on Defamation
Law Reform (NSW Task Force), Defamation Law — Proposals for Reform in NSW, 2002,
p 24, <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/report/lpd_reports.nsf/pages/def_law_proposal>;
S Walker, ‘Lange v ABC: the High Court rethinks the “Constitutionalisation” of defamation
law’ (1998) 6 TLJ 9 at 21, 25; Gillooly, above n 12, p 142; M Chesterman, Freedom of
Speech in Australian Law: A Delicate Plant, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000, pp 142–3; A T
Kenyon, ‘Lange and Reynolds Qualified Privilege: Australian and English Defamation Law
and Practice’ (2004) MULR 406 at 417–18. See especially Morgan v John Fairfax & Sons
Ltd (No 2) (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 387–8 (Hunt AJA with whom Samuels JA agreed).
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The purpose of this article is to examine these questions. In doing so it is
important to appreciate from the outset that the s 22 defence on which the s 30
defence is based is not the first generation version around which the
burdensome judicial interpretation developed but the second generation
version which came into existence when the section was amended (with effect
from 17 February 2003) to insert a list of matters a court may take into account
when determining reasonableness of conduct.16
So to tackle these questions it is proposed first to consider whether and if
so to what extent the previous judicial interpretation survived to burden the
second generation s 22 defence? This issue is still relevant, of course, in its
own right, apart from any light it may shed on an understanding of the way in
which the s 30 defence may operate, given the transition arrangements put in
place for pre- 1 January 2006 publications in New South Wales.17 The enquiry
will then consider the different context in which the s 30 defence lives
compared with its predecessor. It may be that its residence in the uniform
defamation legislation may bring different considerations to bear on the way
it operates.
But first, as a preliminary to these issues, we need to examine the nature of
the first generation s 22 defence and its troublesome reasonableness of
conduct requirement.
The first generation s 22 defence and its troublesome
reasonableness of conduct requirement
An unhappy story of unfulfilled promise
The first generation s 22 defence made its debut in New South Wales with the
enactment of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) on the recommendation of the
NSW Law Reform Commission.18 The way had been paved by the statutory
protection defences in s 17 of the Defamation Act 1958 (NSW)19 and it
seemed that the NSW Law Reform Commission contemplated that s 22 would
do the work of some of these old code defences;20 but, alas, this has not
worked out in practice.21
The s 22 defence aimed to extend the protection of qualified privilege to
defendants who could not satisfy the tough reciprocal duty/interest
requirement of common law qualified privilege.22 This held out great
16 See Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 22(2A), inserted by Defamation Amendment Act 2002
(NSW) Sch 1 [11].
17 Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) Sch 4 cl 2 and Habib v Nationwide News (2006) 65 NSWLR
264.
18 NSW Law Reform Commission, Report of the Law Reform Commission on Defamation,
Report No 11, 1971, App D [101]–[109].
19 But there were problems with these defences, see ibid, App D [89]–[95]; NSW Law Reform
Commission, Defamation, Discussion Paper No 32, 1993, at [9.24]–[9.25].
20 See especially Defamation Act 1958 (NSW) ss 17(d), (e): NSW Law Reform Commission,
Defamation, Discussion Paper No 32, 1993, above n 19, at [9.10] (referring to NSW Law
Reform Commission, 1971, above n 18, App D [103]), at [9.34].
21 NSW Law Reform Commission, Defamation, Report No 75, 1995, at [10.9].
22 Morosi v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 749 (NSW CA) at 797 (Morosi). The
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‘promise’ for media defendants23 as ‘[o]nly in exceptional cases has the
common law recognised an interest or duty to publish defamatory matter to
the general public’.24 As recently explained by Gillard AJA in Herald &
Weekly Times v Popovic, the problem for the media is ‘at least twofold’:
namely, it has never been the duty of any part of the media to publish for profit
untrue facts about a person to the public . . .; and secondly, because the media
publishes to so many persons, it is nearly impossible to conclude that every
publishee, or the great majority of them, had an interest in receiving the particular
information . . .25
So s 22 ditched the troublesome reciprocal duty/interest requirement but the
quid pro quo for doing this was to require that ‘the conduct of the publisher
in publishing [the matter in question] is reasonable in the circumstances’.26
But this reasonableness of conduct requirement in turn proved to be a huge
obstacle for defendants with the result that the availability of the s 22 defence
was severely curtailed. Indeed, ‘only a handful of’ defendants have managed
to successfully raise the defence,27 with it succeeding ‘rarely, if ever’ at the
behest of media defendants.28 Little wonder then that commentators were
heard to lament that what promised to be a boon for defendants failed to
materialise.29
But what was fuelling the reasonableness of conduct obstacle?30 The source
has generally been traced to its ‘restrictive’ interpretation by the courts,
culminating with the approach taken in Morgan v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd
(No 2).31
NSW Law Reform Commission branded this reciprocal duty/interest requirement as
‘artificial’ and ‘insufficiently wide’: NSW Law Reform Commission, 1971, above n 18,
App D [103].
23 Walker, above n 15, p 21; Gillooly, above n 12, p 142 referring to Morosi [1977] 2 NSWLR
749 at 797. Although, as reminded by the NSW Law Reform Commission, s 22 was not
specifically designed to protect the media: NSW Law Reform Commission, 1993, above
n 19, at [9.8].
24 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 570 (citations
omitted) (Lange).
25 (2003) 9 VR 1 at [73] (citations omitted) (Popovic).
26 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 22(1)(c). See NSW Law Reform Commission, 1971, above
n 18, App D [104]; Morosi [1972] 2 NSWLR 749 at 797; Walker, above n 15, at 21.
Section 22(1) also required demonstration that ‘(a) the recipient has an interest or apparent
interest in having information on some subject, [and] (b) the matter is published to the
recipient in the course of giving to the recipient information on that subject’; but these
elements have been considered to be relatively undemanding, with the courts taking a
broader view of what constitutes an ‘interest’ for the purposes of s 22(1)(a) compared with
the common law qualified privilege defence: Austin v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1985) 3
NSWLR 354 (PC) at 358–9 (‘any matter of genuine interest to the readership of the
newspaper’).
27 Kenyon, above n 15, at 418 and see the cases cited at n 95.
28 Nagle v Chulov [2001] NSWSC 9 at [53] (Levine J), as noted by Gillooly, above n 12, at 142
n 170.
29 See, eg, Walker, above n 15, at 21; Chesterman, above n 15, pp 142–3; Gillooly, above n 12,
p 142.
30 Although more accurately referred to as a ‘reasonableness of conduct’ requirement, for ease
of expression this will be subsequently referred to simply as a ‘reasonableness’ requirement.
31 (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 385–6, 387–8 (Hunt AJA with whom Samuels JA agreed)
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The Morgan stumbling block
After reviewing the cases on s 22 reasonableness in Morgan, Hunt AJA
formulated four propositions that are worth setting out in full:
(1) The conduct must have been reasonable in the circumstances to publish each
imputation found to have been in fact conveyed by the matter complained of.
The more serious the imputation conveyed, the greater the obligation upon
the defendant to ensure that his conduct in relation to it was reasonable. Of
course, if any other defence (such as truth or comment) has already been
established in relation to any particular imputation found to have been so
conveyed, it is unnecessary to consider the reasonableness of the defendant’s
conduct in relation to the publication of that particular imputation.
(2) If the defendant intended to convey any imputation in fact conveyed, he must
(subject to the exceptional case discussed in Barbaro’s case, and perhaps also
that discussed in Collins v Ryan) have believed in the truth of that
imputation.
(3) If the defendant did not intend to convey any particular imputation in fact
conveyed, he must establish:
(a) that (subject to the same exceptions) he believed in the truth of each
imputation which he did intend to convey; and
(b) that his conduct was nevertheless reasonable in the circumstances in
relation to each imputation which he did not intend to convey but
which was in fact conveyed.
If, for example, it were reasonably foreseeable that the matter complained of
might convey the imputation which the jury finds was in fact conveyed, it
will be relevant to the decision concerning s 22(1)(c) as to whether the
defendant gave any consideration to the possibility that the matter
complained of would be understood as conveying such an imputation, as will
be his belief in the truth of that particular imputation and what steps he took
to prevent the matter complained of being so understood . . .
(4) The defendant must also establish:
(a) that, before publishing the matter complained of, he exercised
reasonable care to ensure that he got his conclusions right, (where
appropriate) by making proper inquiries and checking on the accuracy
of his sources;
(b) that his conclusions (whether statements of fact or expressions of
opinion) followed logically, fairly and reasonably from the
information which he had obtained;
(c) that the manner and extent of the publication did not exceed what was
reasonably required in the circumstances; and
(d) that each imputation intended to be conveyed was relevant to the
subject about which he is giving information to his readers.
The extent to which the inquiries referred to in para (4)(a) should have been
made will depend upon the circumstances of the case, in particular the nature
and the source of the information which the defendant has obtained, and
whether the position, standing, character and opportunities of knowledge of
(Morgan). See Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Revised Outline, above
n 14, pp 21–2; and see other references cited above n 15.
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the informant (as perceived by the defendant himself) are such as to make his
belief in the truth of that information a reasonable one . . .32
Hunt AJA also added that these ‘propositions do not purport to be
exhaustive’.33
For Walker, the source of the restricting effect of this interpretation is the
view that ‘the defendant must in most cases establish his honest belief in the
truth of what he has written’34 and this was later endorsed by the NSW
Attorney-General’s Task Force on Defamation Law Reform (NSW Task
Force).35 The Morgan view was not put as high as an absolute requirement,
with courts having recognised that there may be exceptions (as indeed did
Hunt AJA himself in Morgan).36 Nevertheless, approaching it as ‘a critical
element’,37 ‘in most cases’,38 has put the s 22 reasonableness requirement out
of the reach of most defendants.
The difficulty is that subjective belief tests are notoriously difficult to
satisfy. Not only this, as we shall see, the Morgan test is particularly
demanding. And satisfying it may also require a defendant to reveal its
sources,39 an option that the media does not usually find very palatable.40 In
addition, the Morgan interpretation makes demands in relation to imputations
which, though found to have been conveyed, were not intended by the
defendant.41
Apart from a demanding subjective element, theMorgan interpretation also
carries with it an objective component. This is not set as high as requiring the
defendant to establish that her honest belief in the truth of the imputation was
reasonable but goes a long way towards this by requiring her to establish
various matters which would go to this end.42 The media defendant in John
Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v O’Shane43 recently felt the sting of this element
when even though the journalist was found to have an honest belief in the truth
32 (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 387–8 (Hunt AJA with whom Samuels JA agreed) (citations
omitted).
33 Ibid, at 388, drawing on the guidance of the Privy Council in Austin v Mirror Newspapers
Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 354 at 360.
34 Walker, above n 15, at 21 (quoting from Morgan (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 385–6, and see
Morgan propositions (2), (3)), 25.
35 NSW Task Force, above n 15, p 24.
36 Morgan (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 387 referring to Barbaro v Amalgamated Television
Services (1990) 20 NSWLR 493 (Barbaro) and Collins v Ryan (1991) 6 BR 229.
37 Barbaro (1990) 20 NSWLR 493 at 500 (Samuels JA).
38 Morgan (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 386 (Hunt AJA).
39 NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 21, at [10.12].
40 Especially in view of cl 3 of the Media Alliance Code of Ethics
<http://www.alliance.org.au/>.
41 See Morgan proposition (3), above n 31 and accompanying text. The rationale for this was
explained by the NSW Court of Appeal in Evatt v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA
99 at [27] (Giles JA with whom Shellar and Powell JJ agreed).
42 See Morgan proposition (4), above n 31 and accompanying text.
43 (2005) Aust Torts Reps 81-789 (O’Shane).
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of the imputations,44 the s 22 defence failed as it was unable to show that ‘that
. . . [the journalist’s] conclusions . . . followed logically, fairly and reasonably
from the information . . . obtained’.45
All in all then, the Morgan interpretation set a very high bar for s 22
reasonableness. So high in fact that it effectively rendered the s 22 defence
‘practically useless’.46 But how does it compare with the reasonableness
requirement in the defence that has come to be known as Lange extended
common law qualified privilege?
Is s 22 reasonableness the same as Lange
reasonableness?
The High Court in Lange set out its reasonableness requirement in these
terms:
Whether the making of a publication was reasonable must depend upon all the
circumstances of the case. But, as a general rule, a defendant’s conduct in publishing
material giving rise to a defamatory imputation will not be reasonable unless the
defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that the imputation was true, took
proper steps, so far as they were reasonably open, to verify the accuracy of the
material and did not believe the imputation to be untrue. Furthermore, the
defendant’s conduct will not be reasonable unless the defendant has sought a
response from the person defamed and published the response made (if any) except
in cases where the seeking or publication of a response was not practicable or it was
unnecessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond.47
The court justified this on the basis that ‘the damage that can be done when
there are thousands of recipients of a communication is obviously so much
greater than when there are only a few recipients’.48 But, as with its s 22
cousin, Lange reasonableness has effectively rendered the extended common
law defence ‘barely useable’.49
After reading Lange, the temptation is to equate the two reasonableness
requirements, especially given that s 22 was seen as the reason why NSW
defamation law complied with the implied guarantee of political
communication.50 And this has tended to be the approach taken by the
44 O’Shane v John Fairfax Publications Ltd (2004) Aust Torts Reps 81-733 at [205] (Smart
AJ).
45 O’Shane (2005) Aust Torts Reps 81-789 at [86]–[90] (Giles JA), at [243], [246] (Young CJ
in EQ) upholding the trial judge’s finding in O’Shane v John Fairfax Publications Ltd
(2004) Aust Torts Reps 81-733 at [201]–[207] (Smart AJ) referring to Morgan
proposition (4)(b), above n 31 and accompanying text. The Commonwealth
Attorney-General also appeared to consider this a burdensome factor in his proposal for a
uniform defamation code: Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Revised Outline,
above n 14, p 22.
46 Applegarth, above n 10, pp 1–3; endorsed by Spence, above n 11, p 1. See also Kenyon,
above n 15, at 418.
47 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 574 (citations omitted).
48 Ibid, at 572. But the court at 573 stressed that ‘reasonableness of conduct is imported as an
element only when the extended category of qualified privilege is invoked to protect a
publication that would otherwise be held to have been made to too wide an audience’.
49 Kenyon, above n 15, at 409.
50 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 569–70.
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courts.51 In O’Shane, for example, Lange reasonableness was knocked out at
first instance because of the absence of a Morgan factor52 and this was not
disturbed on appeal to the NSW Court of Appeal.53 Indeed, Young CJ in Eq
expressed the view, by way of obiter, ‘that overall, reasonableness in Lange
tracks reasonableness under s 22’.54
However, Walker has highlighted a difference in the subjective elements
employed by the two reasonableness requirements: ‘not knowing that
something is false or untrue [Lange] is quite different from a requirement that
the defendant had a positive belief in the truth of the imputation [s 22 as
interpreted by Morgan].’55
Walker bolsters this difference by explaining that the High Court’s approach
in Lange did not extend to an analysis of the Morgan interpretation and so the
High Court should not be taken as approving the Morgan subjective belief
requirement: ‘all it was doing was to approve of a reasonableness requirement
in the terms in which it described’.56
This difference has been picked up by other commentators57 as well as the
NSW Task Force which went on to expressly acknowledge that the Lange
subjective element represents ‘a much more practical and achievable test’
compared with the Morgan subjective element.58 Walker also made the point
in relation to unintended imputations that on the Lange prescription ‘the fact
that the publisher did not foresee the imputation indicates that it was not aware
of its falsity’.59
Secondly, as Walker goes on to point out, Lange reasonableness also
requires an objective test in the form of requiring that ‘the defendant had
reasonable grounds for believing that the imputation was true’.60 The NSW
Task Force had also drawn attention to the ‘mixed message’ character of
Lange reasonableness, involving as it does both subjective and objective
tests.61
However, Morgan reasonableness also puts out a ‘mixed message’ of sorts
for, as already noted, in addition to the subjective belief test, it also carries an
objective element in the form of requiring the defendant to establish various
matters which would go to making the defendant’s ‘belief in the truth of that
51 Although the different statutory environment in New South Wales whereby each imputation
constituted a separate cause of action, had not gone unnoticed: Kenyon, above n 15,
at 418–19 n 102 referring to the observations of Gillard AJA in Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1
at [201].
52 Which was one not mentioned in the Lange list, viz: Morgan proposition 4(b) — ‘that his
conclusions (whether statements of fact or expressions of opinion) followed logically, fairly
and reasonably from the information which he had obtained’: Morgan (1991) 23 NSWLR
374 at 388. See O’Shane v John Fairfax Publications Ltd (2004) NSWSC 140
at [197]–[207] (Smart AJ).
53 O’Shane (2005) Aust Torts Reps 81-789.
54 Ibid, at [308], expressly adopting the view of Kenyon, above n 15, at 418–19.
55 Walker, above n 15, at 25–6.
56 Ibid, at 25.
57 See, eg, Chesterman, above n 15, p 143 n 271 (‘A significant difference’); Kenyon, above
n 15, at 418.
58 NSW Task Force, above n 15, p 27.
59 Walker, above n 15, at 26.
60 Ibid, referring to Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 574.
61 NSW Task Force, above n 15, pp 26–7.
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information a reasonable one’.62 Admittedly, this falls short of the objective
test prescribed in Lange but nevertheless is one that still has some significant
bite as the media defendant in O’Shane recently discovered.
So, in terms of their subjective elements, s 22 reasonableness (as interpreted
by Morgan) may be seen to be more demanding than Lange reasonableness.
But, in terms of their objective elements, s 22 reasonableness is less
demanding than Lange reasonableness, although perhaps not as much as may
have been thought.
A third potential source of difference relates to the scope of the enquiry
provided for in each reasonableness requirement. The Morgan propositions
arguably specify a greater range of matters for the court to consider compared
with the Lange matters and so query whether this will encourage a court to
cast the reasonableness enquiry over a wider front, and so potentially be more
demanding, when determining s 22 reasonableness?
But are these differences more apparent than real? Kenyon’s work
highlights two potential inhibitors on them being realised in practice. One is
that any difference can be ‘too fine’ to be put in argument before a court.63
Another relates to the recent reminders in the cases of the wider framework in
which both requirements operate which emphasise the flexibility inherent in
the concept of reasonableness and deny that the matters specified in the
requirements are essential or exhaustive.64 On this point it is worth recalling
that at the end of the day the quest on both enquiries is to determine what is
reasonable in the circumstances of the case.
This means that a matter not specifically mentioned in Lange
reasonableness may yet be relevant (and possibly even decisive) in
determining Lange reasonableness in the circumstances of a particular case.
This works to collapse the third potential difference identified above. It may
even undermine the first potential difference in that it is conceivable that there
may be circumstances in which a publisher will need to establish the more
demanding Morgan subjective belief in order to establish Lange
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the case. Indeed this is
accommodated by the High Court’s preface, ‘as a general rule’. And if no
Lange matter is essential in all cases, then arguably this erodes the second
potential difference.
Although largely pursued in the academic arena, the question of
sameness/difference in terms of Morgan/Lange reasonableness is not a purely
academic one for it may have far reaching consequences in terms of the
validity and ultimate integrity of the Morgan interpretation.
The integrity of the Morgan interpretation?
Since its inception, some 15 years ago, there have been developments which
threaten theMorgan interpretation but also some which may be seen to bolster
up this interpretation.
62 Morgan (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 388 (see proposition (4), above n 31 and accompanying
text). See also NSW Law Reform Commission, 1993, above n 19, at [9.13].
63 Kenyon, above n 15, at 429 (citations omitted).
64 Ibid, at 418, referring to Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 327 at [30]
(Gleeson CJ and Gummow J) (Rogers); Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1 at [92], [197] (Gillard AJA).
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Has Morgan reasonableness been superseded by Lange
reasonableness?
In O’Shane, the appellant argued that Morgan reasonableness had been
superseded by Lange reasonableness. But this was rejected by the NSW Court
of Appeal. Giles JA pointed out that ‘[t]the High Court was not giving a
detailed explanation [in Lange]’65 and further that it had been subsequently
acknowledged by Gleeson CJ and Gummow J in Rogers v Nationwide News
Pty Ltd that the Morgan interpretation indicated ‘[s]ome considerations of
common relevance’.66 Young CJ in Eq also saw the Rogers treatment of
Morgan as a bar to the appellant’s argument.67
Some retreat from the strict Morgan interpretation?
In O’Shane, Giles JA also reminded that the Morgan interpretation ‘should
not, however, be treated as a statutory prescription’,68 drawing on the
observation of Gleeson CJ and Gummow J in Rogers that ‘reasonableness is
not a concept that can be subjected to inflexible categorisation’.69Young CJ in
Eq also reiterated this observation and consistent with this referred to the
Morgan propositions as ‘guidelines’.70 Earlier the NSW Court of Appeal had
declared in Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden ‘that the
journalistic standard’ set by s 22 ‘is not required to rise to some pinnacle of
unreal perfection’.71
Such judicial reminders would seem to pave the way for a retreat from the
strict Morgan approach to subjective belief so that it may not be seen as ‘a
critical element in most cases’72 and also may not be set at such a demanding
level.
This is further facilitated by the interest taken by Gleeson CJ and
Gummow J in Rogers in ‘the circumstances in which daily newspapers are
published’ when determining reasonableness.73 In Kenyon’s view, the
provision of such information will assist the courts to strike more realistic
journalistic standards.74
Has Roberts v Bass reinforced the Morgan subjective belief
requirement?
The s 22 defence will be defeated by proof of malice on the part of the
defendant by the plaintiff.75 In Roberts v Bass the concept of malice was
65 (2005) Aust Torts Reps 81-789 at [83].
66 Ibid, referring to Rogers (2003) 216 CLR 327 at [30].
67 Ibid, at [227].
68 Ibid, at [83].
69 Ibid, at [83], quoting from Rogers (2003) 216 CLR 327 at [30].
70 Ibid, at [225], [226].
71 [2002] NSWCA 419 at [989] (Marsden).
72 See above nn 37 and 38, combining elements from Barbaro (1990) 20 NSWLR 493 at 500
(Samuels JA) and Morgan (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 386 respectively.
73 Rogers (2003) 216 CLR 327 at [31].
74 Kenyon, above n 15, at 437.
75 Austin v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 383 at 389 (Glass JA) relying on
Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 11; Makim v John Fairfax & Sons (unreported, NSW SC,
Hunt J, 15 June 1990); (1990) A Def R (Online LexisNexis AU) at [50,075], although
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reformulated by the High Court with the result that the absence of an honest
belief in the truth of the matter will no longer be seen as sufficient to constitute
malice.76 The question that arises is whether, and if so to what extent, this
reformulation will impact upon the interpretation of the s 22 reasonableness
requirement? In particular, will this ‘squeezing out’ of the absence of honest
belief from the determination of malice encourage courts to place greater
weight on this matter when determining s 22 reasonableness?
Interestingly, the Roberts v Bass position as regards honest belief vis-a`-vis
malice had already been reached by (some) NSW courts prior to this decision
in the context of the first generation s 22 defence.77 But this adjustment to
malice was made in recognition of the fact that the defendant will be required
in most cases to show an honest belief in what the defendant has published in
order to establish the defence.78
Is the Morgan interpretation vulnerable to a Lange constitutional
challenge?
Can the Morgan interpretation be challenged on the basis that it is not
compatible with the implied constitutional guarantee of political
communication? The question crystallises if it is considered that Morgan
reasonableness is different to, and possibly more demanding than, Lange
reasonableness. But, then again, it has even been suggested that Lange
reasonableness itself may be open to a Lange challenge given that it too has
proved so difficult to satisfy.79
The hurdle is the second limb of the Lange test of compatibility and the
question becomes whether the Morgan interpretation can be characterised as
a:
law [which is] reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a
manner which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed
system of representative and responsible government and the procedure prescribed
by s 128 for submitting a proposed amendment of the Constitution to the informed
decision of the people?80
On the one hand, it could be argued that the Morgan interpretation, with its
disagreeing with Glass JA’s explanation in Austin v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1984] 2
NSWLR 383. See also NSW Law Reform Commission, 1971, above n 18, App D [117].
76 (2002) 212 CLR 1 at [75]–[104] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ), [185] (Kirby J). Cf
Barbaro v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 30 at 50–1 (Hunt J).
77 See Makim v John Fairfax & Sons (unreported, NSW SC, Hunt J, 15 June 1990); (1990) A
Def R (Online LexisNexis AU) at [50,075], Morgan v John Fairfax & Sons (1990) 20
NSWLR 511 at 551 (Hunt AJA). But see Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 at [1020] where it
was observed by the NSW Court of Appeal that: ‘There is an overlap between considerations
applicable to malice and requirements for establishing reasonableness in the context of
s 22(1)(c)’.
78 Morgan v John Fairfax & Sons (1990) 20 NSWLR 511 at 551 (Hunt AJA); Makim v John
Fairfax & Sons (unreported, NSW SC, Hunt J, 15 June 1990); (1990) A Def R (Online
LexisNexis AU) at [50,075].
79 Chesterman, above n 15, p 100.
80 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567, as reformulated in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR
1; 209 ALR 112 by the replacement of the phrase, ‘the fulfilment of’ with, ‘in a manner’:
at [93]–[96] (McHugh J), [196] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), [211] (Kirby J), affirmed in APLA
Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 332; 219 ALR 403 at [58]
(McHugh J), [213] (Gummow J), [348] (Kirby J).
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demanding subjective belief requirement, is not so ‘reasonably appropriate
and adapted’ given that it has set the bar so high that it has rendered the s 22
defence ‘practically useless’.81 However, on the other hand, there are the
recent reminders by the courts about the flexibility of the reasonableness
concept and how it is not expected to reach ‘unreal perfection’ and further that
the Morgan interpretation is not ‘a statutory prescription’ and merely a
‘guideline’.82 The threat of Lange incompatibility may work to reinforce these
reminders and so further facilitate a retreat from the strict Morgan position.
The second generation s 22 defence —
renewed promise?
In 2003, s 22 was amended to insert subs (2A) which provided a statutory list
of matters a court may take into account when determining whether the
publisher’s conduct in publishing the matter in question was reasonable for the
purposes of this defence.83 What impact would this statutory list have on the
way in which second generation s 22 reasonableness is interpreted by the
courts? And would it be enough to revitalise the s 22 defence?
The s 22(2A) statutory list of reasonableness matters
Section 22(2A) provided:
In determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the conduct of the
publisher in publishing matter concerning a person is reasonable in the
circumstances, a court may take into account the following matters and such other
matters as the court considers relevant:
(a) the extent to which the matter published is of public concern,
(b) the extent to which the matter published concerns the performance of the
public functions or activities of the person,
(c) the seriousness of any defamatory imputation carried by the matter
published,
(d) the extent to which the matter published distinguishes between suspicions,
allegations and proven facts,
(e) whether it was necessary in the circumstances for the matter published to be
published expeditiously,
(f) the sources of the information in the matter published and the integrity of
those sources,
(g) whether the matter published contained the substance of the person’s side of
the story and, if not, whether a reasonable attempt was made by the publisher
to obtain and publish a response from the person,
(h) any other steps taken to verify the information in the matter published.
The s 22(2A) list was inserted on the recommendation of the NSW Task
Force and is similar to, but not identical with, the set of factors recommended
by that body.84 These in turn were drawn from (although are not identical
81 Applegarth, above n 10, pp 1–3; Spence, above n 11, p 1.
82 See above nn 68–70 and cases cited there.
83 The amending Act — the Defamation Amendment Act 2002 (NSW) — was passed in 2002
but the relevant amendment to s 22 (see Sch 1 [11]) did not come into operation until
17 February 2003.
84 NSW Task Force, above n 15, Recommendation 13, p 30.
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with) the set of matters proposed by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v Times
Newspapers Ltd85 for the purposes of determining when common law
qualified privilege would extend to media publications, or at least those ‘the
public were entitled to know’.86
The Reynolds expanded common law privilege has been generally
welcomed in England and looked on with not a little envy in certain quarters
of the Australian defamation community.87 However, to date, Australian
courts have resisted attempts to import it into Australian common law.88 This
resistance is fuelled by recognition of the different constitutional environment
in which the Reynolds privilege developed, informed as it is by the Human
Rights Act 1998 (UK) which incorporates several provisions of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1953) including Art 10’s guarantee of freedom of expression; as well as
acknowledgement that ‘[t]he proposition that the High Court in Lange’s case
did not state the law exhaustively is a proposition best left to the High Court
to enunciate in the future’.89 However it remains to be seen whether and if so
to what extent a Reynolds-type approach has been transported together with
the insertion of what are essentially Reynolds factors into the NSW s 22
defence.
Given the judicial interpretation of the first generation s 22 reasonableness,
what is immediately striking about the s 22(2A) statutory list is the absence of
85 [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) (Reynolds): see ibid, at 28.
86 Ibid, at 197. The matters identified by Lord Nicholls are (at 205): (1) The seriousness of the
allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the public is misinformed and the
individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. (2) The nature of the information, and the
extent to which the subject matter is a matter of public concern. (3) The source of the
information. Some informants have no direct knowledge of the events. Some have their own
axes to grind, or are being paid for their stories. (4) The steps taken to verify the information.
(5) The status of the information. The allegation may have already been the subject of an
investigation which commands respect. (6) The urgency of the matter. News is often a
perishable commodity. (7) Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff. He may have
information others do not possess or have not disclosed. An approach to the plaintiff will not
always be necessary. (8) Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the
story. (9) The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise questions or call for an investigation.
It need not adopt allegations as statements of fact. (10) The circumstances of the publication,
including the timing.
Lord Nichols also added that, ‘[t]his list is not exhaustive. The weight to be given to these
and any other relevant factors will vary from case to case’: at 205.
87 Kenyon, above n 15, at 420–34; I Cram, ‘Political Expression, Qualified Privilege and
Investigative Journalism: An Analysis of Developments in English Defamation Law Post
Reynolds v Times Newspapers’ (2005) 11 Canterbury L Rev 143 at 151 and see references
cited at nn 47, 48. The Combined Media Defamation Reform Group indicated a preference
for the Reynolds privilege over the Lange privilege: Combined Media Defamation Reform
Group, Submission in Response to ‘Outline of Possible National Defamation Law’,
Attorney-General’s Discussion Paper — March 2004, 2004, p 46 <http:www.astra.
org.au/content/pdf/DefamationSubmissionMay04.pdf>.
88 See John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Vilo (2001) 52 NSWLR 373 at [107]–[112]; Marsden [2002]
NSWCA 419 at [1165]–[1171].
89 John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Vilo (2001) 52 NSWLR 373 at [108]–[112]; especially at [108],
[110]. This reasoning was subsequently endorsed in Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419
at [1168]–[1169]. Note that although the decision in Reynolds was handed down before the
commencement of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), the House of Lords was mindful of the
demands of that Act in Reynolds: see, eg, [2001] 2 AC 127 at 200 (Lord Nicholls).
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any reference to subjective belief on the part of the defendant — be it an
honest belief in the truth of the matter published or an absence of belief in its
untruth! This factor was also absent from the list recommended by the NSW
Task Force as well as the Reynolds listing.90Also absent from the statutory list
is the Morgan factor which had caused so much trouble for the defendant in
O’Shane referred to earlier (that is, ‘that . . . [the journalist’s] conclusions . . .
followed logically, fairly and reasonably from the information . . .
obtained’).91
The question that arises then is what will be the impact of the insertion of
this statutory list on the way second generation s 22 reasonableness is
interpreted by the courts? Assuming the Morgan propositions to be still on
foot, would they survive to plague second generation s 22 reasonableness? Or
would the amendment allow a shutting of the judicial eye to the Morgan
matters that had caused so much trouble in the past and so work to breathe
new life into the s 22 defence? Would out of statutory sight necessarily mean
out of judicial mind?
The statutory life of the second generation s 22 defence has been cut short
now by the introduction of the uniform defamation legislation. Nevertheless
these questions are still relevant to explore: first, for the light they may shed
upon the way in which its successor in the uniform defamation era may be
interpreted by the courts; and, also in their own right given the transition
arrangements put in place for pre- 1 January 2006 publications in New South
Wales.92
In considering these questions, it is important to note that the reform agenda
that saw the insertion of s 22(2A) into the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) also
resulted in the insertion of a statement of objects into that Act,93 which
included, significantly for present purposes, the object:
(b) to ensure that the law of defamation does not place unreasonable limits on the
publication and discussion of matters of public interest and importance.94
According to the Second Reading Speech:
The inclusion of such a statement will send a clear message that the Defamation Act
should not be interpreted in a way which unreasonably limits discussion on matters
of public importance . . .95
This may well have an impact on the way in which s 22(2A) is interpreted
by the courts given the current preference for a purposive construction.96
90 Its absence from the Reynolds listing did not escape the attention of the NSW Task Force:
above n 15, p 28.
91 Morgan, above n 31, (4)(b) and accompanying text.
92 See above n 17.
93 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 3. This was inserted on the recommendation of the NSW
Task Force, above n 15, pp 1–2 (Recommendation 1) by the Defamation Amendment Act
2002 (NSW) s 3 and Sch 1 [1], and commenced operation on 17 February 2003.
94 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 3(b).
95 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Amendment Bill 2002 (NSW), Legislative Assembly,
12 November 2002 (Tony Stewart, Bankstown Parliamentary Secretary, on behalf of Bob
Debus, NSW Attorney-General), p 1 <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au>.
96 See Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 33.
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Does the incorporation of what are essentially Reynolds
matters necessarily import the Reynolds approach to
those matters?
Kenyon, for one, has seen in the insertion of what are essentially Reynolds
matters into s 22(2A), the promise of a ‘revision’ of s 22 reasonableness.97 In
particular he suggests that s 22(2A)(d) — ‘the extent to which the matter
published distinguishes between suspicions, allegations and proven facts’ —
may provide a gateway for a Reynolds ‘neutral reportage’ submission.98 If this
is the case then the importation of this Reynolds feature has the potential to
undermine any subjective belief requirement. It is also arguable that this
import has the potential to overshadow the other s 22(2A) matters. In Roberts
and Roberts v Gable, Silver and Searchlight Magazine Ltd,99 Eady J expressly
recognised ‘that Lord Nicholl’s tests did not comfortably fit into a reportage
case’100 and went on to uphold the Reynolds privilege defence in the face of
failure on several of the Reynolds factors.
Clearly we will want to keep a watching brief on the English reportage
cases, but just because a Reynolds-type matter has been imported, does that
mean that the courts will necessarily take a Reynolds approach to that matter?
Kenyon has also highlighted that a Reynolds approach would entail a
‘checklist’-type approach to the listed matters.101 This could also shut out
subjective belief on the basis that it is not mentioned in the s 22(2A) list. This
matter is also absent from the Reynolds list and although Lord Nicholls
stressed that that ‘list is not exhaustive’,102 the English Court of Appeal has
asserted that:
We do not consider that a newspaper that is raising a defence of Reynolds qualified
privilege has the onus of establishing an honest belief in the truth of the matter
published.103
But the Reynolds approach has been seen to offer more than a checklist
approach. Kenyon has also highlighted its ‘flexibility’, ‘practicality’ and ‘free
speech sensitivity’.104 In such an environment, restrictive judicial
interpretations would find it difficult to seed, let alone flourish.
However, there are signs that Reynolds may not be the saviour that some
have hoped it to be. One English commentator has suggested that the Reynolds
honeymoon is over and that the English courts have now moved into a
97 Kenyon, above n 15, at 435.
98 Ibid, at 412–14, 435. By ‘neutral reportage’, Kenyon was referring to ‘media reports of
allegations being made by others, at times without publishers even attempting to verify the
allegations’ and drew particular attention to Al–Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing
(UK) Ltd [2002] EMLR 215: at 412–13.
99 [2006] EWHC 1025.
100 Ibid, at [35] (emphasis in original). Eady J also emphasised ‘that reporting both sides, in a
disinterested way, is an important element in the doctrine of reportage’ (emphasis in
original).
101 Kenyon, above n 15, at 412 and see references cited at nn 45, 46.
102 Reynolds [2001] AC 127 at 205.
103 Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 2–5) [2002] QB 783 at [79] (Lord Phillips MR
delivering the judgment of the English CA).
104 Kenyon, above n 15, at 408, 412.
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‘period’ of ‘a less indulgent attitude towards investigative journalism and
political expression’.105 According to Cram, this ‘post Reynolds phase 2’
period is characterised by three ‘troubling features’:
a failure on the part of the courts (including juries) to appreciate the circumstances
in which news-gathering occurs . . . the malleability of the Nicholls’ checklist . . .
[and] the refusal to reduce the Reynolds defence to a test of ‘responsible
journalism’.106
It is also arguable that the Reynolds approach may become bogged down by
the ‘valuable corpus of case law’ that Lord Nicholls foreshadowed would
develop around its factors.107 Although providing guidance, this may also
expose it to a creeping rigidity.
And then there are the recent observations of the English Court of Appeal
in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe APRL (No 2) opening the door for a
defendant to raise subjective belief in order to establish ‘responsible
journalism’ on its part.108 But could this be the slippery slope to requiring
defendants in England to demonstrate an honest belief in the truth of what they
have published?
Nevertheless, to the extent that the Reynolds approach has liberalising
benefits to offer, the question remains whether NSW courts will necessarily
take this approach to the s 22(2A) matters?
This approach is open on the face of s 22(2A), but there is nothing expressly
stated in that section to compel or drive it or indeed to even thwart the survival
of the burdensome Morgan interpretation. There is not even a clear statement
to this effect in the extrinsic materials that may be called in aid when
interpreting s 22. There is no reference to Reynolds in either the Explanatory
Notes or the Second Reading Speech, with the latter simply suggesting that
the list has been inserted to provide ‘a practical means of interpreting what is
and what is not reasonable’.109 The NSW Task Force does refer to the
Reynolds list however and notes that it does not include the defendant’s
subjective belief but does not complete the picture by explaining what it hopes
to achieve by recommending the insertion of what are essentially Reynolds
factors into the s 22 defence.110
Further, there is not the legal and constitutional backdrop that now prevails
in England, by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), to propel a
Reynolds-type approach in New South Wales. This backdrop is apparent in
Lord Nicholls’ plea:
Above all, the court should have particular regard to the importance of freedom of
expression. The press discharges vial functions as a bloodhound as well as a
watchdog. The court should be slow to conclude that a publication was not in the
105 Cram, above n 87, at 152.
106 Ibid, at 155.
107 Reynolds [2001] AC 127 at 205.
108 [2005] EWCACiv 74 at [27] (Lord Phillips MR delivering the judgment of the English CA).
109 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Amendment Bill 2002 (NSW), above n 94, p 2;
Explanatory Notes, Defamation Amendment Bill 2002 (NSW)
<http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au>.
110 NSW Task Force, above n 15, p 28. But see below n 126 and accompanying text.
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public interest and, therefore, the public had no right to know, especially when the
information is in the field of political discussion. Any lingering doubts should be
resolved in favour of publication.111
On the contrary, second generation s 22 reasonableness will have to shake
off baggage without the assistance of Lord Nicholls’ concession:
it should always be remembered that journalists act without the benefit of the clear
light of hindsight. Matters which are obvious in retrospect may have been far from
clear in the heat of the moment.112
It is also arguable that although travelling over similar ground, the Reynolds
exercise is directed to a different end than the s 22 reasonableness exercise and
so may not be completely responsive to the latter’s needs. Consideration of the
s 22(2A) matters is directed towards determining whether the defendant’s
conduct in publishing the matter in question was reasonable in the
circumstances. Consideration of much the same matters in a case where the
Reynolds privilege is raised is directed to weighing up matters for the purposes
of determining whether the common law duty/interest requirement has been
satisfied.113Although reasonableness has been substituted for the common law
duty/interest requirement in the s 22 defence, they are not necessarily the same
thing. And although the term ‘responsible journalism’ has featured in the
Reynolds context, there has been resistance to allowing it to supersede the
traditional common law duty/interest formulation.114 Even if it does then it is
arguable that ‘responsible journalism’ is not necessarily on all fours with the
concept of ‘reasonableness of conduct’.
So, although potentially offering certain liberalising benefits, at the end of
the day, there is no guarantee (apart from somewhat oblique references in
extrinsic materials), that the courts will take a Reynolds approach to the
s 22(2A) matters.
Will the Morgan interpretation survive to plague the
second generation s 22 defence?
Given the problems caused in the past by the stringent subjective belief
element of theMorgan interpretation, the main focus of this enquiry again will
be to examine whether, and if so to what extent, this element survives to
plague the second generation s 22 defence? In any event it is anticipated that
much of the discussion in relation to this element will probably be applicable
to other elements of the Morgan interpretation.
There are several dimensions to this issue.
Can a court still take account of the absence of an honest belief?
The first question that arises is whether a court can still have regard to the
belief of the defendant in the truth of what he or she has written when called
111 Reynolds [2001] AC 127 at 205.
112 Ibid.
113 A distinction between the ‘weighting exercise’ of Reynolds and the ‘reasonable test’ of
s 22(2A) of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) was also drawn by the Combined Media
Defamation Reform Group, above n 87, p 52.
114 See Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 2) [2005] EWCA Civ 74 at [87] (Lord
Phillips MR delivering the judgment of the English CA).
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upon to determine second generation s 22 reasonableness even though this
matter is not specifically mentioned in the s 22(2A) statutory list?
There is nothing expressly prohibiting consideration of such a matter and it
is submitted that just because it is not expressly mentioned in s 22(2A) will not
of itself preclude a court from having regard to it when determining s 22
reasonableness.
In the first place, s 22(2A) does not purport to establish an exhaustive list
of relevant matters. On the contrary, the opening words of the subsection
expressly provide that when determining s 22 reasonableness the court may
take into account the listed matters ‘and such other matters as the court
considers relevant’ (emphasis added). So it can be argued then that s 22(2A)
is creating an expansive (as opposed to an exhaustive) list of relevant matters
which means that even though a matter is not expressly mentioned it can still
be taken into account by a court if considered relevant.
The counter argument might be put however that, granted a court may have
regard to matters not expressly listed in s 22(2A), nevertheless the type of
(unspecified) matters that may be considered is somehow circumscribed by
the nature of the specified matters which appears to be exclusive of subjective
belief; although, it is arguable, that s 22(2A)(f) — ‘the sources of the
information in the matter published and the integrity of those sources’ —
provides a gateway to considering matters which at least go to establishing
honest belief.115 Be that as it may, this expressio unius-style argument is not
of itself always compelling116 and it flies in the face of the very clear authority
given to the courts in the opening words of s 22(2A) to go outside the specified
list.
Nevertheless a further countervailing argument may be mounted having
regard to the purpose of the legislation, especially as stated in s 3(b), along the
lines that a construction that would allow regard to be had to the honest belief
of the defendant would ‘place unreasonable limits on the publication and
discussion of matters of public interest and importance’ and so does not
promote the purpose of the legislation in which case it ‘cannot prevail’ in
accordance with s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW).117
But again there is the very clear statutory authority given to the courts in the
opening words of s 22(2A) to go outside the specified list and merely
considering a potentially limiting matter would not seem to be ‘unreasonable’
and so frustrate the object stated in s 3(b). However this line of argument
would depend on what weight a court decided to put upon this matter.
Turning next to extrinsic materials.118 Unfortunately the Second Reading
Speech is not particularly helpful here. It neither expressly confirms nor
115 NSW Law Reform Commission, above n 21, at [10.12], [10.21].
116 D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 5th ed, Butterworths,
Chatswood, 2001, at [4.26]–[4.27]: ‘Because of these problems with respect to its use,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule is applied by the courts with extreme caution. When
it is followed, it is used more often as a bolster to a predetermined interpretation than as a
rule that in fact produces a result in itself . . .’.
117 Kingston v Keprose (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 at 423 (McHugh JA).
118 Courts interpreting NSW legislation may have regard to extrinsic materials via s 34 of the
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) (provided one of the conditions set out in s 34(1) is satisfied)
or relying on the common law: CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997)
187 CLR 384 at 408 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ); Newcastle City
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denounces consideration of the subjective belief of the defendant. As already
noted, it does suggest however that the list of matters was inserted into s 22
so as to provide ‘a practical means of interpreting what is and is not
reasonable’;119 although it does not go further and explain what it means by
‘a practical means’. Nevertheless, perhaps an argument could be made from
the use of the word, ‘practical’, that it somehow excludes matters of subjective
belief given the recognised difficulty of proving such matters. But, then again,
this is a little cryptic (even for Second Reading Speeches) and may overwork
the word ‘practical’, not to mention the use to which extrinsic materials can
be legitimately put in the light of the guidance provided by Mason CJ, Wilson
and Dawson JJ in Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane.120 But more than this, it does
not really get over the clear statutory authority provided in s 22(2A) to go
outside the statutory list.
Similarly, the Report of the NSW Task Force, which preceded the statutory
amendment, contains no express direction regarding subjective belief but it is
arguable that it evinces an attempt to close out consideration of this matter.
Subjective belief does not appear in the proposed statutory list and there is no
provision in the proposed amendment specifically authorising a court to go
outside the statutory list.121 This proposed statutory silence also comes in the
context of the NSW Task Force calling attention to the problem posed by the
‘restrictive’ judicial interpretation of s 22 reasonableness.122 Further the ‘clear
Australian analogy’ drawn to the listing of ‘best interests of the child’ factors
in the then s 68F(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)123 suggests that the
NSW Task Force had in mind a ‘checklist-type’ approach to its proposed
statutory list; but, s 68F(2) also contained an invitation to consider other
relevant matters.124
Be that as it may, whatever can be made of the NSW Task Force’s omission
of such an invitation, this omission did not make it into the legislation for as
already noted the opening words of s 22(2A) contain clear statutory authority
for a court to go outside the statutory list.
There is also the argument that if the legislature wanted to prohibit courts
from considering the subjective belief of the defendant then it could have
taken the opportunity to insert an express provision to this effect when
amending the section, and it did not.
So, it is submitted that, failing to specify the belief of the defendant in the
truth of the imputation as one of the relevant matters in s 22(2A) will not of
itself preclude a court from considering this matter when called upon to
determine second generation s 22 reasonableness — putting this matter out of
statutory sight is not necessarily enough to put it out of the court’s mind.
Council v GIO General Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 85 at 99–100 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow
JJ) and at 112–13 (McHugh J); 149 ALR 623. And see Pearce and Geddes, above n 115,
at [3.6].
119 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Amendment Bill 2002 (NSW), above n 94, p 2.
120 (1987) 162 CLR 514 at 517–18.
121 NSW Task Force, above n 15, p 30.
122 Ibid, p 24.
123 Ibid, p 29. Note that s 68F of the Family Law Act has been recently repealed by the Family
Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth).
124 Family Law Act s 68(F)(2)(l) provided: ‘The court must consider . . . (l) any other fact or
circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.’
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But will a court necessarily have regard to an absence of
honest belief?
So accepting that it is still open to a court to have regard to the belief of the
defendant in the truth of what he or she has written, the next question is, will
a court necessarily have regard to this matter?
By specifying a set of relevant matters, the temptation may be for courts to
treat this as a checklist for determining s 22 reasonableness. On this approach,
a court would work its way through the list, systematically checking off and
rating the defendant’s case on each matter. Because it is not one of the listed
matters, it may be that the belief of the defendant will be overlooked
notwithstanding the ‘gateway’ provided in the opening words to s 22(2A).
(And after all, the court will have enough to do dealing with each of the listed
8 matters!)
As already noted, this seems to be the approach taken in England to the
Reynolds matters. And it was also noted then that there is English Court of
Appeal authority to the effect that a defendant is not required to show an
honest belief in the truth of the matter in question in order to rely on the
Reynolds privilege. But as discussed, there is no guarantee that the Reynolds
approach will be taken to s 22(2A) and further the Reynolds approach does not
guarantee that a defendant’s subjective belief will be ignored.
But, moreover, given the previous judicial attitude to this matter in New
South Wales, what plaintiff is not going to agitate a court to not only have
regard to the belief of the defendant in what he or she has written but also to
continue to accord this matter the same prominence it enjoyed prior to the
insertion of the s 22(2A) statutory list under the Morgan interpretation?
So the question becomes whether absence of an honest belief will be as
critical for second generation s 22 reasonableness?
Will the absence of an honest belief be as critical?
Certainly there is no express denouncement in the amended s 22 along the
lines of a statement to the effect that ‘it is not necessary for a defendant to
show that he or she believed in the truth of the imputation in order to establish
that his conduct in publishing the matter in question was reasonable in the
circumstances’.
However it could be argued that by specifying a wide range of
reasonableness matters and failing to specify an honest belief in the truth of
the imputation in s 22(2A), parliament’s intention was to diminish the
importance of this matter in the determination of s 22 reasonableness. In this
way the statutory list may be seen as performing an extending function:
encouraging the courts to extend the parameters of the reasonableness enquiry.
So while it is still open to a court to have regard to this matter, the absence of
an honest belief in the truth of the imputation on the part of a defendant will
generally not be fatal to establishing s 22 reasonableness.
To counter this, it could be argued that parliament’s intention in specifying
relevant matters was to make it clear, whereas there may have been doubt
before, that the particular matters specified could be taken into account in
determining s 22 reasonableness. So in this way the statutory list is performing
a legitimating or authorising function. On this view, it could be argued that
there was no need to mention an honest belief in the truth of the imputation
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because it was already so well accepted by the courts as a relevant matter and
indeed in most cases would be a critical matter in the determination of s 22
reasonableness.
On the other hand, looking to the specific matters mentioned in s 22(2A),
and in particular ‘(d) the extent to which the matter published distinguishes
between suspicions, allegations and proven facts’, it is arguable that this
provides a way of undermining and possibly overriding an honest belief
requirement. This may be assisted, as suggested by Kenyon, by the Reynolds
neutral reportage cases, although, as already discussed, there is no guarantee
that the Reynolds approach will be taken by the courts.125
Further, having regard to the purpose of the legislation (especially as stated
in s 3(b)), it might be argued that a construction which grafts the Morgan
subjective belief view on to s 22 works to ‘place unreasonable limits on the
publication and discussion of matters of public interest and importance’, given
that such a view has severely curtailed the availability of an important defence
for publishers, and so does not promote the purpose of the legislation, and so
‘cannot prevail’ in accordance with s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987
(NSW).126
Looking to the Second Reading Speech, it does not expressly devalue the
defendant’s belief in the imputation except to the extent that the desire to
provide ‘a practical means’ for determining s 22 reasonableness can be
pressed to argue against the continuation of almost unachievable
requirements.
Similarly, the NSW Task Force did not expressly denounce a requirement
on the defendant’s part to show that he or she believed in the truth of the
imputation although it did declare that the statutory list of relevant matters:
ought to make clear to decision makers that it is not necessary for a publisher who
wishes to invoke qualified privilege to prove that they had objective grounds for
believing in the truth of the matter published.127
This is perhaps a little unexpected given the problem conceived by the
NSW Task Force for defendants wishing to rely on the s 22 defence was the
judicial requirement ‘to prove that they believed in the truth of what was
published’.128 But, then again, as noted earlier, the NSW Task Force also
highlighted the ‘mixed message’ character of the Lange test of reasonableness,
requiring as it does an objective element in addition to a subjective element,129
and so perhaps the thrust of the NSW Task Force’s quest then was to thwart
the grafting on to s 22 reasonableness of the Lange objective requirement
(namely, that ‘the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that the
imputation was true’)?130
However further support for diminishing the importance accorded to the
125 See above nn 96–113 and accompanying text.
126 Kingston v Keprose (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 at 423 (McHugh JA).
127 NSW Task Force, above n 15, p 29 (emphasis added).
128 Ibid, p 24 (citations omitted).
129 Ibid, pp 25–6.
130 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 574. Although, with all due respect, query how this desire
could hope to be realised in the absence of an express statutory provision given the almost
irresistible invitation to at least go down this path provided by a listing of matters which
largely go to establishing this objective element?
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defendant’s belief in the truth of what he or she has written may be drawn
from the apparent recent softening of the court’s attitude to the application of
the Morgan interpretation to the first generation s 22 defence noted earlier.
So the provision of a statutory listing of reasonableness matters, exclusive
of subjective belief, may distract a court from according the honest belief of
the defendant Morgan prominence, especially if a checklist approach is taken
and especially in the light of the object stated in s 3(b) and encouraged by an
apparent recent relaxation in judicial attitude to the application of Morgan
generally. But, it is submitted, that this second generation form of the s 22
defence is not cast in bold enough terms to completely block this severely
inhibiting interpretation. If this was the desired outcome then a stronger
indication in both the legislation and the related extrinsic materials would be
have been helpful.
What about dropping to a less demanding subjective belief?
If subjective belief has survived the statutory amendment as a relevant, if not
‘a critical element in most cases’,131 in the determination of s 22
reasonableness then an interesting question arises as to whether a persuasive
case can be made in favour of dropping the level of subjective belief down to
the less demanding Lange requirement that ‘the defendant did not believe the
imputation to be untrue’?132
As noted earlier, this was acknowledged by the NSW Task Force to be
‘a much more practical and achievable test’ compared with the Morgan
prescription.133
Use of the word ‘practical’ also resonates well with the Second Reading
Speech and so it might then be argued that the less demanding form may better
assist the amendment’s goal of providing ‘a practical means of interpreting
what is and is not reasonable’134 than does requiring an honest belief in the
truth of the imputation. However, comments buried in extrinsic materials are
not necessarily determinative of statutory meaning.135
On another tack, dropping to the less demanding form will bring s 22
reasonableness into line with Lange reasonableness — at least in terms of their
subjective elements. But, as was noted earlier, the less demanding subjective
belief has been accepted in Lange in the context of simultaneously requiring
a more demanding objective element, namely, that ‘the defendant had
reasonable grounds for believing that the imputation was true’. So would
dropping down to the less demanding subjective test lead to the imposition of
a more demanding objective requirement for s 22 reasonableness?
It could if the desire to maintain parity with Lange reasonableness is strong
enough (at least in terms of its articulation). But to do so would apparently fly
in the face of the express direction given to the contrary by the NSW Task
Force.136 But this direction did not find specific statutory expression in the
131 See above n 72.
132 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 574.
133 NSW Task Force, above n 14, p 27.
134 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Amendment Bill 2002 (NSW), above n 94, p 2
(emphasis added).
135 Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 at 518 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ).
136 See above n 126 and accompanying text.
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amendment to s 22. Nor did it even find specific expression in the amendment
recommended by the NSW Task Force. So, with all due respect, how was this
position to be made ‘clear’? Simply not imposing a requirement does not
necessarily guarantee that a provision will not be interpreted to incorporate
that requirement: out of statutory sight does not necessarily mean out of
judicial mind. And, again, extrinsic comments will not necessarily be given
effect by the courts when interpreting legislation.137 So while support to ward
off the imposition of an objective test may be drawn from the purpose of the
legislation, buoyed by comments in extrinsic materials, these are not the most
solid grounds on which to rely especially in the face of the almost irresistible
invitation to go down this path sent out by the nature of the matters listed in
s 22(2A).138
Likely distraction, but at what cost?
We have seen that specifying a range of matters may have the effect of
distracting attention away from those not expressly mentioned (and subjective
belief in particular) but at what cost does this distraction come? Will it have
the effect of casting the reasonableness net so wide that it erects another
difficult hurdle for defendants to jump?
This will depend on the way in which courts approach the statutory list in
s 22(2A). Will they consider themselves obliged to consider all of the matters
listed when determining s 22 reasonableness? If they do then, having regard
to the nature and number of matters listed, this will work to cast the
reasonableness enquiry over a very wide ground and so potentially impose a
very onerous burden on publishers.139 Or, will courts see the list as simply
authorising or legitimating (if there was any doubt) consideration of the
particular matters listed leaving it then to them to pick and choose which
matters are actually considered relevant in any case?
It is submitted that the wording and structure of s 22(2A) work towards
supporting the pick-and-choose approach in preference to the checklist
approach. First, the opening words of s 22(2A) provide that ‘a court may take
into account the following matters . . .’140 and traditionally the word ‘may’ is
interpreted as conferring a discretion rather than imposing an obligation.141
Further the matters in the list that follows are not connected by ‘and’ which is
the usual trigger for a cumulative listing.142
However it seems that the NSW Task Force may have had a checklist
approach in mind when it drew what it described as the ‘clear Australian
analogy’ to what it proposed with the statutory list of ‘best interests of the
137 Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514 at 518 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ).
138 Although admittedly s 22 falls short of imposing an objective grounds test, see above n 42
and accompanying text.
139 Gillooly has drawn attention to this potential in relation to both Lange reasonableness as
well as s 22 reasonableness and laments that ‘the range and breadth of the reasonableness
requirement renders it an unsuitable mechanism for striking the appropriate balance between
quality and quantity of information flow’: Gillooly, above n 12, pp 158–61.
140 Emphasis added.
141 Pearce and Geddes, above n 115, at [11.5]; although this is not a hard and fast rule and there
have been cases where the courts have interpreted ‘may’ as ‘imposing an obligation’: see
Ch 11.
142 Ibid, at [2.25], and see also [12.2].
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child’ factors contained in (the now repealed) s 68F(2) of the Family Law
Act,143 although it did not go all the way with this analogy in the terms of the
amendment it proposed.
Section 68F(2) set up a statutory list of must-consider factors when
determining the best interests of a child. This was made clear in s 68F(1) and
reinforced in the opening words of s 68F(2) as well as the use of ‘and’ between
the last two matters in the listing.144
The amendment proposed by the NSWAttorney-General’s Task Force does
not go this far and lacks the express direction found in the former ss 68F(1)
and 68F(2). Even so, there is no discretion conferred in the opening words to
the proposed statutory list and this list uses ‘and’ between the last two matters.
But, what was finally enacted differs from what was recommended by the
Task Force in two important ways: first, the opening words of s 22(2A) appear
to confer a discretion; and, secondly the trigger for a cumulative listing is
absent. And so it is arguable that parliament did not intend to create a checklist
of must-consider matters to be taken into account when determining s 22
reasonableness.
This view may also be supported by having regard to the purpose of the
legislation, especially as stated in s 3(b), in that a checklist of must-consider
matters may cast the reasonableness enquiry so wide as to work to deny a
defence and so it may be argued that a construction which mandates this
approach does not promote the purpose of the legislation and so in accordance
with s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) ‘cannot prevail’.145And again
it is worth reminding about the constraint on the use of extrinsic materials as
an aid to statutory interpretation referred to earlier.
Nevertheless while s 22 may not require a must-consider checklist, it may
still be open to a court to consider all of the matters listed in s 22(2A) in any
particular case. And the courts may be encouraged to do this by the approach
taken by English courts to the Reynolds factors. However there will be some
tricky issues to be worked out by the courts in terms of the weighting to be
accorded to each factor: are some matters more significant or to be weighted
more than other matters? Will any matters be determinative? What will be
sufficient to neutralise a poor rating on a particular matter? To the extent that
the analogy with the former s 68F(2) ‘best interests of the child’ factors is
relevant then it is interesting to note the observations of Dickey:
The 12 considerations set out in s 68F(2) are not listed in order of importance or
priority. Accordingly, no one consideration has any greater significance than any
other. Some considerations may overlap with others . . . [And] the relevance of each
consideration naturally depends upon the particular issues involved in any case.146
This, it might be recalled, echoes the Reynolds approach.147
On the other hand, the pick-and-choose approach is not without its issues.
In particular, it does not eliminate the weighting issue and may also be
143 NSW Task Force, above n 15, p 29.
144 See A Dickey QC, Family Law, 4th ed, Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 2002, pp 404–6.
145 Kingston v Keprose (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 at 423 (McHugh JA).
146 Dickey, above n 143, p 406 (citations omitted).
147 See above n 85.
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unpredictable as regards which factors may be selected in any case and so lead
to uncertainty.
What do the cases say?
It is still relatively early days in the short life of the second generation s 22
defence and at the time of writing the author was not aware of a reported case
in which the courts had clarified the impact of the insertion of a statutory list
of reasonableness matters on the operation of the s 22 defence. In the
meantime however the NSW Court of Appeal has expressed the view that the
Morgan propositions and s 22(2A) are ‘not inconsistent’.148 Although
obiter,149 it does open the door to the survival of theMorgan propositions into
the s 22(2A) era.
So, where does this leave the second generation s 22 defence?
The statutory list of reasonableness matters was inserted into s 22
‘[s]eemingly in an attempt to alter . . . [the] balance’ in favour of plaintiffs
wrought by previous judicial interpretation.150 However while this
amendment provides several opportunities for reviving the s 22 defence, it
does not necessarily block the previous demanding judicial interpretation.
Consequently the second generation s 22 defence may still be vulnerable to
constraint along Morgan lines.
So, what does all this mean for the s 30 statutory
qualified privilege defence in the uniform defamation
legislation era?
Section 30 of the uniform defamation legislation151 ‘is based on’ the second
generation s 22 defence,152 and so we might expect that the s 30 defence will
operate in much the same way as its NSW predecessor including being
plagued by much the same problems. But will this necessarily be the case
given that s 30 also lives in a different context to its predecessor?
148 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Zunter [2006] NSWCA 227 at [23] (Handley JA with
whom Spigelman CJ and McColl JA agreed) endorsing the view expressed in the court
below, see Zunter v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 759 at [32]
(Simpson J). Simpson J was mindful that the s 22(2A) ‘catalogue’ does not include the
honest belief of the defendant: at [33].
149 As the publication date in question predated the commencement of s 22(2A). See O’Shane
(2005) Aust Torts Reps 81-789 at [223] (Young CJ in EQ).
150 M Sexton and T K Tobin, Australian Defamation Law and Practice, Online LexisNexis AU,
at [14,115].
151 This is a reference to Defamation Act 2005 (NSW). See above n 1, and see n 9 for the
relevant provisions in the other Acts forming the uniform defamation legislative scheme. As
references to the uniform defamation legislation are references to Defamation Act 2005
(NSW), references to extrinsic materials will be to extrinsic materials associated with the
that Act unless otherwise indicated.
152 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Bill 2005 (NSW), Legislative Assembly, 13 September
2005, p 5 (Bob Debus, NSW Attorney-General, Minister for the Environment and Minister
for the Arts) <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au>; Explanatory Notes, Defamation Bill
2005 (NSW), p 8 <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au>.
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The s 30 statutory qualified privilege defence
A quick comparison of s 30 and its s 22 predecessor reveals that their terms
are almost identical, although there are some differences. Of note, in relation
to the list of reasonableness matters, is: the extension by way of the addition
of ‘the nature of the business environment in which the defendant operates’ in
s 30(3)(e); the replacement of the necessity criterion in s 22(2A)(e) for
publishing expeditiously with one of ‘public interest’ in s 30(3)(e); and, the
joining of the reasonableness matters in s 30(3) with the word, ‘and’, whereas
there is no conjunction in the s 22(2A) listing. There is also a 10th matter in
the s 30(3) list but para (j) merely encapsulates the invitation in the opening
words of s 22(2A) to go outside the statutory list to consider ‘any other
circumstance that the court considers relevant’. Modifications to the statutory
list were described as ‘minor’ in the NSW Second Reading Speech.153 There
is also a new subsection making it clear that the statutory qualified privilege
defence will be defeated by proof of malice on the plaintiff’s part (s 30(4)).
Given s 30’s pedigree, we would expect that much of the discussion
concerning the meaning and effect of the second generation s 22 defence
would be applicable to the s 30 defence. Based on the foregoing analysis, we
might expect then that the s 30 defence may also be threatened by the
troublesome Morgan interpretation with its demanding subjective belief
requirement.
However s 30 lives in a different context to that of its predecessors and the
question that arises is whether and if so to what extent features of this different
context may bring different considerations to bear?
Section 30 lives in uniform national legislation
The most apparent contextual difference is that s 30 lives in uniform national
legislation whereas s 22 was housed in ordinary (NSW) state legislation.
This means that courts other than NSW courts may be called upon to
interpret and apply the s 30 defence: courts which do not share the same
allegiance to NSW jurisprudence as NSW courts may do. They will probably
be aware of the pedigree of s 30154 and mindful of the problems and
frustrations that have plagued its predecessor, such was the notoriety of the
first generation s 22 defence. And so they may be minded to take opportunities
to adopt an interpretation that avoids these difficulties while being consistent
with the terms of s 30. And this impetus may even be more stronger in those
jurisdictions (namely, Queensland and Tasmania) where defendants have
enjoyed statutory qualified privilege defences free from the burden of having
to establish an honest belief in the truth of the imputation.155
If a less demanding interpretation was forthcoming then there would be
153 Although only the first two modifications were noted: Second Reading Speech, Defamation
Bill 2005 (NSW), above n 151, p 5.
154 For example via the extrinsic materials.
155 See the former statutory qualified protection defences in 16 of the Defamation Act 1889
(Qld) and s 16 of the Defamation Act 1957 (Tas) respectively. These defences required the
publication to be ‘made in good faith’ but this concept used the less demanding subjective
belief element of ‘not believ[ing] the defamatory matter to be untrue’ [see Defamation Act
1889 (Qld) s 16(2); Defamation Act 1957 (Tas) s 16(2)]; and, ‘the burden of proof of the
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certain pressure on subsequent courts (including courts in other states and
territories) to follow this in the interests of maintaining uniformity, ‘unless
convinced that that interpretation was plainly wrong’.156
Another possible source of difference may arise to the extent that there is
variance from the NSW purposive and extrinsic materials provisions in ss 33
and 34 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) respectively in the various
jurisdictions participating in the uniform scheme.
Section 30 also lives in a different legislative context
Although the uniform defamation legislation largely reflects the Defamation
Act 1974 (NSW), there are some important differences. And so the question
here is whether and if so to what extent these differences may impact upon the
operation of the s 30 defence?
Differences in the wording of s 30(3)
First, in terms of s 30 itself, as already noted, s 30(3) is set up a little
differently to its s 22(2A) predecessor in that each of the matters in s 30(3) is
connected with ‘and’ whereas the matters in s 22(2A) are not. It is not clear
why there has been a change in wording and neither the NSW Second Reading
Speech nor the NSW Explanatory Notes sheds any light on this. It may be that
by inserting ‘and’ between the matters there is a stronger argument in favour
of a checklist approach whereby a court will consider all the matters listed.
However there is still the discretion in the opening words to s 30(3) and so it
is arguable that the section simply authorises consideration of the various
matters listed rather than mandates their consideration although, as pointed
out earlier, even on this view, it would still be open for a court in any case to
proceed to consider each of the matters listed in s 30(3).
Secondly, there is the new matter inserted in the statutory list of
reasonableness matters in s 30(3), namely ‘(f) the nature of the business
environment in which the defendant operates’. This was not specifically
recommended by the NSWTask Force. Nor does it feature in the Reynolds list.
There is also no explanation in the NSW Second Reading Speech or the NSW
Explanatory Notes as to why this matter was included or what it means.
Nevertheless it should come as no surprise, especially in view of the
encouragement given by Gleeson CJ and Gummow J in Rogers to adduce
evidence of ‘the circumstances in which daily newspapers are published’.157
The potential of such material to assist in the setting of more realistic
journalistic standards has already been noted.158 However query whether
s 30(3)(f) may also provide a gateway to wider considerations going more
directly to, and possibly even countering an absence of, subjective belief of
the defendant? Could it, for example, open another door to neutral reportage,
if, say, the defendant was in the business of investigative journalism?
absence of good faith’ was cast on the plaintiff: Defamation Act 1889 (Qld) s 17;
Defamation Act 1957 (Tas) s 19. See also Gillooly, above n 12, pp 148–9.
156 ASC v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 at 492 (Mason CJ, Brennan,
Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). See also AMacAdam and J Pyke, Judicial Reasoning and
the Doctrine of Precedent in Australia, Butterworths, Sydney, 1998, at [715]–[7.17].
157 Rogers (2003) 216 CLR 327 at [31].
158 See above nn 72–3 and accompanying text.
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A broader objects clause
The statement of objects in the uniform defamation legislation, while ‘very
similar’ to s 3 of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW),159 is arguably broader than
its predecessor, especially the s 3(b) object which reads:
to ensure that the law of defamation does not place unreasonable limits on freedom
of expression and, in particular, on the publication and discussion of matters of
public interest and importance (emphasis added).
So arguments based on a purposive approach to the interpretation of the
uniform defamation legislation arguably have a broader base now from which
to work and one which would favour a less strict interpretation of s 30
compared with its predecessor.
Abandonment of the NSW imputation system
A third difference relates to the abandonment of the NSW imputation system
whereby each imputation constituted a separate cause of action160 in
preference for the general law position that the publication of defamatory
material constitutes the cause of action.161
According to the NSW Second Reading Speech, this is ‘a significant but
very welcome change’ which ‘will . . . put an end to . . . needless complexity’
in New South Wales.162 That remains to be seen. But, in the meantime, query
what (if any) impact this change will have on the operation of the s 30
defence?
One change which has already been suggested is that the defendant will no
longer be required to show reasonableness in relation to the imputations
pleaded by the plaintiff and found to be defamatory (which may be unintended
by the defendant).163
Expansion of the role of juries (in most jurisdictions)
Another potential difference relates to the expansion of the role of juries
wrought by the uniform defamation legislation.
Previously, in New South Wales, all aspects of defences (questions of fact
as well as law) were determined by the judge.164 However, under the uniform
defamation legislation, a jury (where one is elected) will determine the
defences165 — at least, in most jurisdictions.166
159 Second Reading Speech Defamation Bill 2005 (NSW), above n 151, p 2. Apart from of
course containing the additional object relating to the desire to promote a uniform national
defamation law (see s 3(a)). Interestingly the object contained in Defamation Act 1974
(NSW) s 3(d) did not make it into s 3 of the uniform national defamation legislation.
160 See Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 9(2).
161 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 8.
162 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Bill 2005 (NSW), above n 151, p 2.
163 George, above n 6, at [25.3]. See Wright v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1977] 1
NSWLR 697 at 705 (Moffitt P); Morgan (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 390; and more recently
Evatt v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 99 at [26] (Giles JA with whom Powell
and Shellar JJA agreed).
164 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 7A(4)(a).
165 See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 21, 22, and esp s 22(2).
166 As noted earlier, the use of juries is a point on which uniformity was not achieved, see above
n 2.
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We might expect that a change in decision-maker could have an effect on
the way a defence operates. But query whether this change is more apparent
than real for the s 30 defence?
Section 22(5)(b) of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) provides:
Nothing in this section: . . .
(b) requires or permits a jury to determine any issue that, at general law, is an
issue to be determined by the judicial officer.
‘[G]eneral law’ is defined in s 4 to mean ‘the common law and equity’.
Common law assigned the task of determining whether an occasion was
privileged to the judge, leaving the jury (where there is one) to decide
contested questions of fact underpinning that determination.167
So how does this fit with the s 30 defence? Can we say that determining
whether there is a defence under s 30 is tantamount to determining whether
there is an occasion of qualified privilege? If so, then this would be a question
for the judge and not the jury.
This was the position in relation to the s 22 defence prior to the withdrawal
of all aspects of the defences from the jury in New South Wales in 1995.168
However this division of function between judge and jury was supported by
s 23 of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW).169 Case authority then confirmed
that it was for the jury to decide any underlying questions of fact in
accordance with the common law position.170
However there is no direct counterpart to s 23 in the Defamation Act 2005
(NSW). Nor is there a provision which equates establishing a defence under
s 30 with an occasion of qualified privilege as there was under s 20(1)(c) of
the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) in relation to s 22.171 But there is a reference
in s 31(5)(b) of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) to ‘an occasion of absolute
or qualified privilege (whether under this Act or at general law)’ which seems
to acknowledge that other provisions in the Act set up occasions of qualified
privilege, although this does fall short of an express equation of the two
situations.
167 Calwell v Ipec Australia (1975) 135 CLR 321 at 329 (Mason J with whom Barwick J
(at 325); Gibbs J (at 325); Stephen J (at 325) and Jacobs J (at 334) agreed).
168 Defamation (Amendment) Act 1994 (NSW) inserted s 7A into the Defamation Act 1974
(NSW) effective from 1 January 1995, see especially s 7A(4)(a). See Austin v Mirror
Newspapers Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 383 at 387–8 (Glass JA); Barbaro (1990) 20 NSWLR
493 at 497 (Samuels JA, with whom Hope AP and Priestley JA agreed); Morgan v John
Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 511 at 517 (Samuels AP), 526 (Mahoney JA),
538–40 (Hunt AJA); Morgan (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 382 (Hunt AJA with whom
Samuels JA agreed); and more recently, Evatt v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA
99 at [14] (Giles JA with whom Shellar JA and Powell JA agreed).
169 This provision was recommended by the NSW Law Reform Commission so as to ‘make
explicit’ the position in relation to the proposed statutory qualified privilege defences: NSW
Law Reform Commission, 1971, above n 18, App D [112].
170 ‘As both statutory and common law defences co-exist, and indeed as both may be relied
upon by the defendant in the same action, it would be extraordinary if the division of
functions in relation to each were to be different’: Morgan v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1990)
20 NSWLR 511 at 539. See also the cases cited above n 167.
171 In Austin v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 383 at 388 Glass JA also relied on this
provision to import the common law division of function between judge and jury to the s 22
defence. However, as pointed out by Gillooly, this statutory equation is arguably only for the
purposes of s 20: above n 12, p 140 and n 160.
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Hence the argument for importing the common law division of function
between judge and jury into the s 30 defence may not be as strong as it was
in relation to its s 22 pre-1995 predecessor under the Defamation Act 1974
(NSW) and may have to rely on the reference in s 30 itself to ‘[t]here is a
defence of qualified privilege . . .’.
However if it does succeed then the question of reasonableness would also
be one ultimately for the judge as it constitutes ‘[one] of the essential elements
of the defence’.172 This was the position in relation to the s 22 defence (prior
to 1995)173 and there is also authority that this is the position in relation to the
Lange extended common law qualified privilege defence.174 To the extent that
it accords with the common law position then it may draw support from
s 22(5)(b) of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) assuming the primary link
between establishing the s 30 defence and an occasion of qualified privilege
can be made in the first place.
We will have to wait for clarification from the courts but at this stage it
looks as though the question of reasonableness will remain largely in the
hands of the judges with juries (where they have been elected) only having
input on underlying disputed questions of facts. This means that the apparent
change in decision-maker wrought by the uniform defamation legislation may
not have as much impact for the s 30 defence as may have first appeared, well,
at least not in terms of the way in which the defence is applied.
But the involvement of a jury under this division of function may well have
a significant adverse impact in terms of litigating the s 30 defence, especially
if juries are bombarded with the detailed and lengthy sets of questions in
relation to the s 30(3) matters their English counterparts have experienced in
relation to the Reynolds matters when the Reynolds privilege has been
argued.175 Kenyon’s research found that ‘practitioners (both here and in
England) supported juries having a general role in addressing
reasonableness’.176 It is interesting to note that this preference has recently
found expression in ‘the defence of fair and reasonable publication’ provided
for by the Defamation Bill 2006 (Ireland).177
172 Morgan v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 511 at 540 (Hunt AJA).
173 Barbaro (1989) 20 NSWLR 493 at 496–9 (Samuels JA with whom Hope AP and
Priestley JA agreed), Morgan v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 511 at 540
(Hunt AJA).
174 Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1 at [118] (Gillard AJA with whom Winneke ACJ and Warren AJJA
agreed on this point at [12] and [509] respectively).
175 As highlighted by Kenyon, above n 15, at 413–14, 426–7.
176 Ibid, at 430–1 (emphasis in original).
177 Defamation Bill 2006 (Ireland), s 24 <http://www.oireachtas.ie/
ViewDoc.asp?fn=/home.asp>. This is a ‘new’ defence for Ireland: Explanatory and Financial
Memorandum, Defamation Bill 2006 (Ireland) at [25] <http://www.oireachtas.ie/
ViewDoc.asp?fn=/home.asp>. It is akin to the Australian s 30 defence though differs in a
number of important respects including expressly casting the jury as decision-maker on the
question of whether publication has been ‘fair and reasonable’: s 24(2), (5). Another
important difference is that it is expressly provided that the defence ‘shall fail unless . . . the
defendant proves that — (a) at the time of the publication he or she believed the statement
to be true . . .’: s 24(4)(a).
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Link to Reynolds in extrinsic materials
On the question of the application of a Reynolds type approach to the s 30(3)
reasonableness matters, it is arguable that stronger support may be gleaned
from the associated extrinsic materials with an express link to Reynolds
having been made in the NSW Explanatory Notes (though not in the NSW
Second Reading Speech) and recognition there that the s 30(3) matters
‘largely mirror’ the Reynolds matters.178 But again it does not go further and
expressly encourage a Reynolds type approach to that list. And again the
reminder about the tenuity of arguments based on extrinsic comments as to
statutory meaning.
So, where does this leave the s 30 defence?
The s 30 defence looks and feels like the s 22 defence from the Defamation
Act 1974 (NSW) albeit with some little change in its wording. So it is
understandable that there will be an expectation that the s 30 defence will
operate in the same way as its s 22 predecessor. But what exactly does that
mean?
As far as the writer is aware, the courts had not yet clarified the effect of the
insertion of a statutory list of reasonableness matters on the operation of the
s 22 defence before its life was cut short by the introduction of the uniform
defamation legislation and so we do not really know how the second
generation s 22 defence operates. Certainly we know that the availability of
the first generation s 22 defence had been very severely curtailed by the
constricting way in which it had been interpreted by the courts especially
under Morgan and its demanding subjective belief requirement. But just
because a statutory list has been inserted which looks like the Reynolds list
does not necessarily mean that it will bring about a Reynolds approach or lead
to a Reynolds-type defence. More particularly, just because this list does not
include the subjective belief of the defendant does not necessarily mean that
it will be stripped of its relevance, if not Morgan prominence — out of
statutory sight does not necessarily mean out of judicial mind.
So although arguments can be made to thwart carrying over the Morgan
subjective belief requirement, it is arguable that the second generation s 22
defence is still vulnerable to this interpretation. And there is authority, albeit
obiter, to this effect.179
Similar arguments can be made to thwart the export of this judicial
interpretation to the s 30 defence in the uniform defamation legislation. And
certain further arguments along this line can be crafted, drawing upon the
different context in which the s 30 defence appears. But at the end of the day
there is still no guarantee that s 30 will be shielded and protected fromMorgan
demands.
If this is the case then s 30 may well suffer the same unhappy fate as befell
its statutory grandmother and be left with little real work to do.
The foregoing analysis has concentrated on the possible survival of the
Morgan subjective belief requirement. However this is not the only source of
178 Explanatory Notes, Defamation Bill 2005 (NSW), above n 151, p 8.
179 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Zunter [2006] NSWCA 227.
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constriction flowing from Morgan. There is proposition 4(b) — ‘that . . . [the
defendant’s] conclusions . . . followed logically, fairly and reasonably from
the information . . . obtained’180 — which proved to be the stumbling block
for the defendant in O’Shane. This was presumably perceived as burdensome
by the Commonwealth Attorney-General as it was specifically excluded from
his proposal for a statutory ‘reasonable publication’ qualified privilege
defence.181 This matter has also not made it into either the s 22(2A) listing or
the s 30(3) listing of reasonableness matters but many of the arguments that
were advanced in relation to the continuing relevance of the Morgan
subjective belief requirement to s 30 could also apply to the relevance of
Morgan proposition 4(b) to that defence.
In addition, the persistence of the Morgan interpretation is not the only
potential source of restriction on s 30 reasonableness. Some of the specifically
listed s 30(3) reasonableness matters hold further potential in this regard
depending on how that list is approached and interpreted by the courts.
Possible problems spots include s 30(3)(h) — ‘whether the matter published
contained the substance of the person’s side of the story and, if not, whether
a reasonable attempt was made by the defendant to obtain and publish a
response from the person’. It was one of its Reynolds cousins that largely
foiled the success of the privilege defence in that case.182 And the second
aspect (relating to seeking a response) has been exposed by Chesterman as:
not sympathetic to the pressures to meet deadlines that normally affect the media and
at worst might give the plaintiff an opportunity to delay, if not prevent, a wholly
justifiable publication by instituting proceedings for an injunction to restrain
publication.183
Although query whether and if so to what extent this may be
counterbalanced in the s 30 context by considerations going to s 30(3)(f) (‘the
nature of the business environment in which the defendant operates’) and also
possibly s 30(3)(e) (‘whether it was in the public interest in the circumstances
for the matter published to be published expeditiously’)? Moreover there is
authority for the view that the absence of this factor is not necessarily fatal to
the Lange extended defence,184 although it might be recalled that Lange
reasonableness expressly provides for an out where it ‘was not practicable or
it was unnecessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond’.185 There is
also authority for the view that the absence of this factor was not necessarily
fatal to the first generation s 22 defence.186 And then there is the prospect of
having to reveal sources raised by s 30(3)(g). The Reynolds cousin is tempered
by Lord Nicholls plea that ‘[i]n general, a newspaper’s unwillingness to
180 Morgan (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 388.
181 Commonwealth Attorney-General, Revised Outline, above n 14, 22 and cl 14 of the
proposed Defamation Bill Provisions.
182 Namely, Reynolds matter (8) — ‘Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side
of the story’. See Reynolds [2001] AC 127 at 206 (Lord Nicholls).
183 Chesterman, above n 15, pp 101–2 (citations omitted).
184 See, eg, Brander v Ryan (2000) SASC 226 (SA SC Full) at [124] (Lander J, with whom
Prior and Bleby JJ agreed).
185 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 574 (emphasis added).
186 O’Shane v John Fairfax Publications Ltd (2004) Aust Torts Reps 81-733 at [204], Smart AJ
found:
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disclose the identity of its sources should not weigh against it’;187 but we will
have to wait and see whether this sentiment will be applied to s 30(3)(g).
Looking forward . . .
It is not really clear why the NSW model for a statutory qualified privilege
defence was incorporated into the uniform defamation legislation. According
to the NSW Second Reading Speech:
Essentially, the [Defamation] bill retains some of the best features of the present
New South Wales Defamation Act 1974, jettisons some of its more problematic
provisions, and introduces some worthwhile reforms.188
But based on the foregoing analysis, it is difficult to class the s 22 defence
as one of the ‘best features’ of NSW defamation law! It may well operate
however as a counterbalance to some of the early assessments that the uniform
defamation legislation is pro-defendant.189
The shortcomings of the s 22 model however seemed to have been
appreciated by the Commonwealth Attorney-General in his proposal for a
uniform defamation code.190
The Commonwealth proposal incorporates two types of statutory qualified
privilege defences. One is a group of qualified privilege defences in specified
circumstances which draws largely from s 16(1) of the Defamation Act 1889
(Qld).191 And the second is a ‘reasonable publication’ qualified privilege
defence192 which, though ‘broadly modelled’ upon the second generation s 22
defence,193 differs from that defence in several important ways. Notably, the
subjective belief of the defendant is included in the cl 14(2) list of
reasonableness matters although the less demanding form is specified
(namely, ‘whether the defendant believed that any facts conveyed by the
matter were untrue’);194 there is no invitation to go outside the list of specified
matters when determining reasonableness; the opening words of cl 14(2), and
It was not unreasonable for (the journalist) not to have made any enquiries of or sought
a response from (the plaintiff, a magistrate) prior to the publication. The conduct of a
judicial officer, as to the court cases heard and decided, is evaluated on what that person
says and does in court.
187 See Reynolds matter (3); Reynolds [2001] AC 127 at 205.
188 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Bill 2005 (NSW), above n 151, p 2.
189 See, eg, The Hon David Levine RFD QC, Former Justice of the Supreme Court of NSW, and
Adjunct Professor, UTS Faculty of Law, (Speaker at the ‘Defamation and Sedition Laws
“ANewWay of Talking” Public Seminar’, UTS, Sydney, 3 April 2006), reproduced on ABC
Radio National, ‘Uniform Defamation; and the Cost of Celebrity Journalism’,Media Report,
13 April 2006, p 2 <http://abc.net.au/rn/mediareport/stories/2006/1614411.htm>; Richard
McHugh, (Defamation Seminar, Commercial Law Association’s Leading Edge Seminar
Series, Sydney, 25 May 2006), as reported by Y C Kux, ‘Notes from a Defamation Seminar’
Gazette of Law and Journalism, 25 May 2006, <http://www.lawpress.com.au/
genews/ge171_Defamation_seminar_250506.html>.
190 Commonwealth Attorney-General, Revised Outline, above n 14, see cls 13 and 14 of the
proposed Defamation Bill Provisions.
191 Ibid, pp 20–1 and cl 13 of the proposed Defamation Bill Provisions.
192 Ibid, pp 21–3 and cl 14 of the proposed Defamation Bill Provisions.
193 Ibid, p 21.
194 Ibid, cl 14(2)(b) of the Defamation Bill Provisions.
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especially the use of ‘regard may be had to any or all of the following’,195
suggest that the list is not intended to be a checklist of must-consider matters;
and, apparently the defence will not be defeated by malice.
It was claimed that differences in the operation of the proposed cl 14,
compared with the s 22 defence, would work to shield the proposed defence
from the s 22 judicial interpretation.196 But that would not come without
certain costs. For example, constructing an exhaustive list of reasonableness
matters (assuming this has been achieved, which is in doubt) may shut out the
more demanding Morgan subjective belief requirement197 from the
reasonableness enquiry but this in turn restricts the scope of that enquiry and
so may inject a measure of inflexibility into that enquiry.
It is a shame that the opportunity to rethink the statutory qualified privilege
defence was not taken by the states and territories when drafting their model
defamation provisions. Achieving uniformity was clearly the top priority of
the stakeholders,198 and what energy (and political will) there was left over for
reform just seemed to be channelled elsewhere. And then there was the
ever-pressing Commonwealth Attorney-General’s deadline to comply with.199
But it is never too late for reform! Now we have achieved uniformity, the
holy grail for defamation law reform is to refine and improve the uniform
defamation legislation. And we have a commitment to reform supported by an
intergovernmental agreement between the states and territories.200 There is
also the statutory promise of a review of the uniform defamation legislation
after five years.201 This is a plea then for the s 30 defence to be put on the
reform agenda and attended to at the earliest possible opportunity.
The starting point for any review should be to consider the rationale for a
statutory qualified privilege defence, heeding Henskens’ insight that without
‘a clear policy basis’, the courts have ‘been inclined to interpret s 22 in a
conservative fashion’.202
Any review should also examine alternate models for a statutory qualified
privilege defence — s 22 with its reasonableness requirement is not the only
model for a statutory qualified privilege defence. Nor is the Commonwealth
Attorney-General’s model. There have already been reminders of the
195 Emphasis added.
196 Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Revised Outline, above n 14, p 22.
197 As well as the other troublesome Morgan matter, namely that proposition 4(b) ‘that his
conclusions . . . followed logically, fairly and reasonably from the information which . . .
[the publisher] had obtained’: Morgan (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 at 388.
198 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Bill 2005 (NSW), above n 151, p 6.
199 Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, ‘States Move Forward on Defamation But
Still Not Uniform’, Media Release 178/2004, 5 November 2004, <http://www.ag.
gov.au/agd/WWW/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases>; Commonwealth
Attorney-General’s Department, ‘States & Territories Must Enact Workable Defamation
Laws’, Media Release 031/2005, 5 March 2005, <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/
WWW/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases>; Commonwealth Attorney-
General’s Department, ‘Belated State Defamation Laws’, Media Release 237/2005,
15 December 2005, <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/
WWW/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/Media_Releases>.
200 Second Reading Speech, Defamation Bill 2005 (NSW), above n 151, p 6.
201 See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 49.
202 Henskens, above n 13, at 268. According to Henskens, the NSW Law Reform Commission
failed to provide this in its 1971 Report.
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Queensland and Tasmanian Code models.203 And Gillooly has proposed yet
another model which protects publishers ‘when they have made an honest and
reasonable mistake, which they have used their best endeavours to rectify’.204
And this is not an exhaustive list of the possibilities.
Opening the door to alternate models of course brings the reasonableness of
conduct requirement to centre stage. Any review should examine carefully the
rationale for retaining this requirement. As justification, the Commonwealth
Attorney-General relied on the observations of Tipping J in Lange v Atkinson:
It could be seen as rather ironical that whereas almost all sectors of society, and all
other occupations and professions have duties to take reasonable care, and are
accountable in one form or another if they are careless, the news media whose power
and capacity to cause harm and distress are considerable if that power is not
responsibly used, are not liable in negligence, and what is more, can claim qualified
privilege even if they are negligent. It may be asked whether the public interest in
freedom of expression is so great that the accountability which society requires of
others, should not also to this extent be required of the news media.205
However Gillooly has challenged the retention of this requirement as a
‘quality control mechanism’ arguing that while it may be appropriate in the
tort of negligence arena it does not work so well in the defamation context,
reminding that:
It is not just the interests of plaintiffs and defendants which are at stake, but also
those of the recipients of the defamatory communications.206
Understandably this point was also pressed by the Combined Media
Defamation Reform Group when it proposed abandoning a reasonableness
requirement.207
And if it is considered desirable to retain a reasonableness of conduct
requirement then there are further issues that need to be explored. Based on
the forgoing analysis, these include:
(a) the role (if any) of the defendant’s subjective belief in the matter
published in determining reasonableness and the nature of that
subjective belief. The Combined Media Defamation Reform Group
has provided the following food for thought:
Democratic societies rely on debate, disagreement, accusation
and rebuttal. Requiring the media to, in effect, believe such
material to be true is too high a standard and out of step with
the underlying objective. For example, in a developing scandal,
how is the media to formulate belief in the truth and still
produce timely, relevant reports to the public? The whole point
of such a story is that the truth is unknown and that various
facts and points of view are emerging.208
203 See, eg, Applegarth, above n 10; Spence, above n 11.
204 Gillooly, above n 12, p 163. This is set out and explained at pp 163–5.
205 Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 at 477, as quoted in Commonwealth
Attorney-General’s Department, Revised Outline, above n 14, p 22.
206 Gillooly, above n 12, p 159. See also pp 160–1.
207 Combined Media Defamation Reform Group, above n 87, pp 45, 46, 50.
208 Ibid, p 47.
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(b) the role (if any) of requiring demonstration of objective grounds for
the defendant’s belief.
(c) the relationship between reasonableness and malice.
(d) the proper division of function between judge and jury. Kenyon’s
work suggests that it may be better in terms of ‘practice’ to put the
general question of reasonableness to the jury rather than burdening
it with a multitude of specific questions.209
(e) overall, what is an appropriate, and workable, standard of
reasonableness? The New South Wales experience is that if it is
pitched too high then we could lose a potentially valuable defence.
Such a review should also afford tighter drafting so that desired outcomes
are not dependent upon uncertain statutory interpretation principles and
promising comments buried in extrinsic materials. Out of statutory sight does
not necessarily mean out of the court’s mind (and certainly not that of a
plaintiff).
As reiterated by the High Court in Lange:
The purpose of the law of defamation is to strike a balance between the right to
reputation and freedom of speech.210
But simply keeping a defence on the books which has no work to do is surely
only to pay lip-service to freedom of speech. And simply transplanting failing
features of particular states’ and territories’ gardens into the new Australian
uniform defamation landscape will not necessarily be enough to breathe new
life into those features. Something more may be needed. It is hoped that the
s 30 defence will not have to wait too much longer for careful attention.
209 Kenyon, above n 15, at 419, 430–1, 433–4.
210 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 568 (citations omitted).
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